Abstract—This paper considers a real-time electricity market involving an independent system operator (ISO) and a group of strategic generators. The ISO operates a market where generators bid prices at which they are willing to provide power. The ISO makes power generation assignments with the goal of solving the economic dispatch problem and regulating the network frequency. We propose a multi-rate hybrid algorithm for bidding and market clearing that combines the discrete nature of iterative bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. We establish sufficient upper bounds on the inter-event times that guarantee that the proposed algorithm asymptotically converges to an equilibrium corresponding to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Our technical analysis builds on the characterization of the robustness properties of the continuous-time version of the bidding update process interconnected with the power network dynamics via the identification of a novel LISS-Lyapunov function. Simulations on the IEEE 14-bus system illustrate our results.

I. INTRODUCTION

The dispatch of power generation in the grid has been traditionally done in a hierarchical fashion. Broadly speaking, cost efficiency is ensured via market clearing at the upper layers and frequency regulation is achieved via primary and secondary controllers at the bottom layers. Research on improving the performance of these layers has mostly developed independently from each other, motivated by their separation in time-scales. The increasing penetration of renewables poses significant challenges to this model of operation because of its intermittent and uncertain nature, see e.g., [2], [3]. At the same time, the penetration of renewables also presents an opportunity to rethink the architecture and its hierarchical separation towards the goal of improving efficiency and adaptiveness. A key aspect to achieve the integration of different layers is the characterization of the robustness properties of the mechanisms used at each layer, since variables at the upper layers cannot be assumed in steady state any more at the lower ones. These considerations motivate our work on iterative bidding schemes combined with continuous physical network dynamics and the correctness analysis of the resulting multi-rate hybrid interconnected system.

Literature review: The integration of economic dispatch and frequency regulation in power networks has attracted increasing attention in the last decades. Many recent works [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] envision merging the design of primary, secondary, and tertiary control layers for several models of the power network/micro-grid dynamics with the aim of bridging the gap between long-term optimization and real-time frequency control. In scenarios where generators are price-takers, the literature has also explored the use of market mechanisms to determine the optimal allocation of power generation and to stabilize the frequency with real-time (locational marginal) pricing, see [12], [13], [14], [15]. Our present work shares with [16], [17] the use of dynamic iterative bidding schemes by the ISO, although in these works the setting is stochastic, the agents react in a price-taking manner, and their dynamics is assumed to be decoupled from one another. Instead, [18] proposes iterative bidding schemes where the generators are strategic, leading to efficient Nash equilibria where power generation levels minimize the total cost as intended by the ISO. Inspired by [18] and [15], our work [19] has shown that the integration with the frequency dynamics of the network can also be achieved in scenarios where generators are price-setters. However, the integration in [19] relies on a continuous-time model for the bidding process, where the frequency coming from the power network dynamics enters as a feedback signal in the negotiation process. Instead, we account here for the necessarily discrete nature of the bidding process and explore the design of provably correct multi-rate hybrid implementations that realize this integration. This involves the identification of a strictly decreasing Lyapunov function (compared to the weak Lyapunov function employed in [19]) that allows us to go beyond the characterization of asymptotic stability of the continuous-time dynamics and establish strong robustness guarantees. These guarantees set the basis for our design here of a provably correct, multi-rate hybrid algorithm implementation.

Statement of contributions: We consider an electrical power network consisting of an ISO and a group of strategic generators. The ISO seeks to ensure that the generation meets the load with the minimum operation cost and the grid frequency is regulated to its nominal value. Each generator seeks to maximize its individual profit and does not share its cost function with anyone. The ISO operates the market, where generators bid prices at which there are willing to provide power, and makes power generation assignments based on the bids and the local frequency measurements. Our goal is to design mechanisms that ensure the stability of the interconnection between the ISO-generator bidding process and the physical network dynamics while accounting for the different nature (iterative in the first case, evolving in continuous time in
the second) of each process. Our starting point is a continuous-time bid update scheme coupled with the physical dynamics of the power network whose equilibrium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Our first contribution is the characterization of the robustness properties of these dynamics against additive disturbances. To achieve this, we identify a novel local Lyapunov function that includes the energy function of the closed-loop system. The availability of this function not only leads us to establish local exponential convergence to the desired equilibrium, but also allows us rigorously establish its local input-to-state stability properties. Building on these results, our second contribution develops a time-triggered hybrid implementation that combines the discrete nature of iterative bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. In our design, we introduce two iteration loops, one (faster) inner-loop for the bidding process that incorporates at each step the frequency measurements, and one (slower) outer-loop for the market clearing and the updates in the power generation levels, that are sent to the continuous-time power network dynamics. We refer to this multi-rate hybrid implementation as time-triggered because we do not necessarily prescribe the time schedules to be periodic. To analyze its convergence properties, we regard the time-triggered implementation as an approximation of the continuous-time dynamics and invoke the robustness properties of the latter, interpreting as a disturbance their mismatch. This allows us to derive explicit upper bounds on the length between consecutive triggering times that guarantee that the time-triggered implementation remains asymptotically convergent. The computation of these upper bounds does not require knowledge of the efficient Nash equilibrium. Simulations on the IEEE 14-bus power network illustrate our results.

**Notation:** Let \( \mathbb{R}, \mathbb{R}_0, \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \mathbb{Z}_0, \mathbb{Z}_{>1} \) be the set of real, nonnegative real, positive real, nonnegative integer, and positive integer numbers, respectively. For \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1} \), we use the shorthand notation \([m] = \{1, \ldots , m\}\). For \( A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n} \), we let \( \|A\| \) denote the induced 2-norm. Given \( v \in \mathbb{R}^n, A = AT \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} \), we denote \( \|v\|_A := v^T Av \). The notation \( \mathbb{I} \in \mathbb{R}^n \) is used for the vector whose elements are equal to 1. The Hessian of a twice-differentiable function \( f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) is denoted by \( \nabla^2 f \).

II. POWER NETWORK FREQUENCY DYNAMICS

Here we present the model of the physical power network that describes the evolution of the grid frequency. The network is represented by a connected, undirected graph \( G = (V, E) \), where nodes \( V = [n] \) represent buses and edges \( E \subseteq V \times V \) are the transmission lines connecting the buses. Let \( m \) denote the number of edges, arbitrarily labeled with a unique identifier in \([m]\). The ends of each edge are also arbitrary labeled with ‘+’ and ‘−’, so that we can associate to the graph the incidence matrix \( D \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \) given by

\[
D_{ik} = \begin{cases} 
+1 & \text{if } i \text{ is the positive end of edge } k, \\
-1 & \text{if } i \text{ is the negative end of edge } k, \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]  

A spanning tree \( T \) is as a connected acyclic subgraph of \( G \) that contains all vertices of \( G \). The incidence matrix \( D_T \) associated to \( T \) is constructed as in (1). Each bus represents a control area and is assumed to have one generator and one load. Following [20], the dynamics at the buses is described by the following **swing equations**

\[
\dot{\delta} = \omega,
\]

\[
M \dot{\omega} = -D_T \sin(D_T^T \delta) - A \omega + P_g - P_d.
\]  

Here, \( \Gamma = \text{diag}\{\gamma_1, \ldots , \gamma_m\} \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m}, \gamma_k = B_{ij} V_i V_j \), where \( k \in [m] \) corresponds to the edge between nodes \( i \) and \( j \). For the asymptotic stability analysis carried out in Sections IV and V, we assume that the load \( P_d \) is constant. Table I specifies the meaning of the symbols used in the power network model (2). The validity of this model relies on the following assumptions, which are standard in the literature on power network dynamics [20], [21], and we state here for completeness.

**Assumption II.1. (Swing equation model):** For the power network dynamics described by (2), the following hold:

- Lines are lossless, i.e., the conductance of all lines is zero. This is generally valid for transmission lines;
- Nodal voltages \( V_i \) are constant;
- Reactive power flows are ignored;
- Network is balanced such that the three-phase network can be analyzed by a single phase.

To avoid issues in the stability analysis of (2) due to the rotational invariance of \( \delta \), see e.g., [22], we introduce a new set of variables. To this end, consider an arbitrary spanning tree \( T \) of \( G \) and let \( D_T \) be its associated incidence matrix. Consider \( \varphi = D_T^T \delta \in \mathbb{R}^{n-1} \) representing the voltage phase angle differences along the edges of this spanning tree. The physical energy stored in the transmission lines is given by

\[
U(\varphi) = -\mathbb{I}^T \Gamma \cos(D_T^T D_T^T \varphi),
\]  

where \( D_T^T = (D_T^T D_T)^{-1} D_T^T \) denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of \( D_T \). By noting that \( D_T D_T^T = (I - \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{I} \mathbb{I}^T) D = D \), the system (2) in the \((\varphi, \omega)\)-coordinates takes the form

\[
\dot{\varphi} = D_T^T \omega,
\]

\[
M \dot{\omega} = -D_T \nabla U(\varphi) - A \omega + P_g - P_d.
\]

In the sequel we assume that, for the power generation \( P_g = \bar{P}_g \), there exists an equilibrium \( (\hat{\varphi}, \hat{\omega}) \) of (4) that satisfies

\[
D_T^T D_T^T \varphi \in (\frac{-\pi}{2}, \frac{\pi}{2})^m. 
\]
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT

In this section we formulate the problem statement and then discuss the paper objectives. We start from the power network model introduced in Section II and then explain the game-theoretic model describing the interaction between the ISO and the generators following the exposition of [23], [18].

The cost incurred by generator $i \in [n]$ in producing $P_{gi}$ units of power is given by

$$ C_i(P_{gi}) := \frac{1}{2} q_i P_{gi}^2 + c_i P_{gi}, \quad (5) $$

where $q_i > 0$ and $c_i \geq 0$. The total network cost is then

$$ C(P_g) := \sum_{i \in [n]} C_i(P_{gi}) = \frac{1}{2} P^T Q P + c^T P_g, \quad (6) $$

with $Q = \text{diag}(q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ and $c = \text{col}(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$. Given the cost (6) and the constant power loads $P_d$, the ISO seeks to solve the economic dispatch problem

$$ \begin{align*}
& \text{minimize} \quad C(P_g), \\
& \text{subject to} \quad 1^T P_g = 1^T P_d, \quad (7a)
\end{align*} $$

and, at the same time, regulate the network frequency to its nominal value. Since the function $C$ is strongly convex, there exists a unique optimizer $P^*_g$ of (7). However, we assume that the generators are strategic and they do not reveal their cost functions to anyone, including the ISO. Consequently, the ISO is unable to determine the optimizer of (7). Instead, it determines the power dispatch according to a market clearing procedure in which each generator submits bids to the ISO.

We consider price-based bidding: each generator $i \in [n]$ submits the price per unit electricity $b_i \in \mathbb{R}$ at which it is willing to provide power. Based on these bids, the ISO finds the power generation allocation that minimizes the total generator payment while meeting the load. More precisely, given the bid $b = \text{col}(b_1, \ldots, b_n)$, the ISO solves

$$ \begin{align*}
& \text{minimize} \quad b^T P_g, \\
& \text{subject to} \quad 1^T P_g = 1^T P_d. \quad (8a)
\end{align*} $$

The optimization problem (8) is linear and may in general have multiple (unbounded) solutions. Among these solutions, let $P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b) = \text{col}(P^\text{opt}_{g1}(b), \ldots, P^\text{opt}_{gn}(b))$ be the optimizer of (8) the ISO selects given bids $b$. Knowing this process, each generator $i$ aims to bid a quantity $b_i$ to maximize its payoff

$$ \Pi_i(b_i, P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b)) := P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b) b_i - C_i(P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b)). \quad (9) $$

For an unbounded optimizer we have $\Pi_i(b_i, \pm \infty) = -\infty$. To analyze the clearing of the market, we resort to tools from game theory [24]. To this end, we define the inelastic electricity market game:

- Players: the set of generators $[n]$.
- Action: for each player $i \in [n]$, the bid $b_i \in \mathbb{R}$.
- Payoff: for each player $i \in [n]$, the payoff $\Pi_i$ in (9).

We refer to the game as inelastic, as the load is not affected by the bids $b_i$. For the bid vector we interchangeably use the notation $b \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $(b_1, \ldots, b_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$, where $b_{-i}$ represents the bids of all players except $i$. A bid profile $b^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is a Nash equilibrium if there exists an optimizer $P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b^*)$ of (8) such that $\forall i \in [n],$

$$ \Pi_i(b_i, P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b^*_i)) \leq \Pi_i(b^*_i, P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b^*)) $$

for all $b_i \neq b^*_i$ and all optimizers $P^\text{opt}_{gi}(b_i, b^*_{-i})$ of (8). In particular, we are interested in bid profiles that can be associated to economic dispatch. More specifically, a bid $b^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is efficient if there exists an optimizer $P^*_g$ of (7) which is also an optimizer of (8) given bids $b = b^*$ and

$$ P^*_g = \arg \max_{P_g} \{P_g b^*_i - C_i(P_{gi})\} \text{ for all } i \in [n]. \quad (10) $$

A bid $b^*$ is an efficient Nash equilibrium if it is both efficient and a Nash equilibrium. At the efficient Nash equilibrium, the optimal generation allocation determined by (7) coincides with the production that the generators are willing to provide, maximizing their profit (9). Following the same arguments as in the proof of [23, Lemma 3.2], one can establish the existence and uniqueness of the efficient Nash equilibrium.

**Proposition III.1.** (Existence and uniqueness of efficient Nash equilibrium): Let $(P^*_g, \lambda^*)$ be a primal-dual optimizer of (7), then $b^* = \nabla C(P^*_g) = 1 \lambda^*$ is the unique efficient Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game.

In the scenario described above, neither the ISO nor the individual strategic generators are able to determine the efficient Nash equilibrium beforehand. Our goal is then to design an online bidding algorithm where ISO and generators iteratively exchange information about the bids and the generation quantities before the market is cleared and dispatch commands are sent. The algorithm should be truly implementable, meaning that it should account for the discrete nature of the bidding process, and at the same time ensure that network frequency, governed by the continuous-time power system dynamics, is regulated to its nominal value. The combination of these two aspects leads us to adopt a hybrid implementation strategy to tackle the problem.

IV. ROBUSTNESS OF THE CONTINUOUS-TIME BID AND POWER-SETPOINT UPDATE SCHEME

In this section, we introduce a continuous-time dynamics that prescribes a policy for bid updates paired with the frequency dynamics of the power network whose equilibrium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. In this scheme, generators update their bids in a decentralized fashion based on the power generation quantities received by the ISO, while the ISO changes the generation quantities depending on both the generator bids and the network frequency. This design is a simplified version of the one proposed in our previous work [19]. The main contribution of our treatment here is the identification of a novel Lyapunov function that, beyond helping establish local exponential convergence, allows us to characterize the input-to-state stability properties of the dynamics. We build on this characterization later to develop our time-triggered hybrid implementation that solves the problem outlined in Section III.
A. Bidding process coupled with physical network dynamics

Recall from Section III that given bid $b_i$, generator $i \in [n]$ wants to produce the amount of power that maximizes its individual profit, given by

$$P_{g_i}^{\text{des}} := \arg\max_{P_{g_i}} \{b_i P_{g_i} - C_i(P_{g_i})\} = q_i^{-1}(b_i - c_i).$$

(11)

Hence, if the ISO wants generator $i$ to produce more power than its desired quantity, that is $P_{g_i} > P_{g_i}^{\text{des}}$, generator $i$ will increase its bid, and vice versa. Bearing this rationale in mind, the generators update their bids according to

$$T_i b = P_g - Q^{-1} b + Q^{-1} c.$$  

(12a)

Here $T_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is a diagonal positive definite matrix. Next, we provide an update law for the ISO depending on the bid $b \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and the local frequency of the power network. The ISO updates its actions according to

$$T_g \dot{P}_g = \lambda \lambda - b + \rho \lambda \lambda^T (P_d - P_g) - \sigma^2 \omega, \quad \tau \lambda \lambda = \lambda^T (P_d - P_g).$$

(12b)

with parameters $\rho, \sigma, \tau \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}$ and where $T_g \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is a diagonal positive definite gain matrix.

The intuition behind the dynamics (12b) is explained as follows. If generator $i$ bids higher than the Lagrange multiplier $\lambda$ (sometimes referred to as the shadow price [25]) associated to (8b), then the power generation (setpoint) of node $i$ is decreased, and vice versa. By adding the term with $\rho > 0$, one can enhance the convergence rate of (12b), see e.g., [26]. We add the feedback signal $-\sigma \omega$ to compensate for the frequency deviations in the physical system. Interestingly, albeit we do not pursue this here, the dynamics (12) could also be implemented in a distributed way without the involvement of a central regulating authority like the ISO.

For the remainder of the paper, we assume that there exists an equilibrium $\bar{x} = \text{col}(\bar{\varphi}, \bar{\omega}, \bar{b}, \bar{P}_d, \bar{\lambda})$ of (4)-(12) such that $D^T D \dot{\varphi} \in (-\pi/2, \pi/2)^n$ (cf. Section II). Note that this equilibrium satisfies

$$\bar{\lambda} = \frac{1}{1 + (b - \bar{b})^2} > 0, \quad \bar{\omega} = 0, \quad \bar{b} = 1 \bar{\lambda}, \quad \bar{P}_g = Q^{-1} \bar{\lambda} - Q^{-1} c, \quad 1 \bar{P}_d = \lambda^T P_d.$$ 

(13)

In particular, at the steady state, the frequency deviation is zero, the power balance $1^T \dot{P}_d = \lambda^T P_d$ is satisfied, and $1^T \bar{\lambda} = \bar{b} = \nabla C(\bar{P}_g)$, implying that $\bar{P}_g$ is a primal optimizer of (7) and $\bar{b}$ is an efficient Nash equilibrium by Proposition III.1. Hence, at steady state the generators do not have any incentive to deviate from the equilibrium bid.

B. Local input-to-state (LISS) stability

While the ISO dynamics (12b) is a saddle-point dynamics of the linear optimization problem (8) (and hence, potentially unstable), we show next that the interconnection of the physical power network dynamics (4) with the bidding process (12) is locally exponentially stable and, furthermore, robust to additive disturbances. First, inspired by our previous work [19], we define the function

$$V(x) = U(\varphi) - (\varphi - \bar{\varphi})^T \nabla U(\bar{\varphi}) - U(\bar{\varphi}) + \frac{1}{2} \omega^T M \omega$$

+ \frac{1}{2 \sigma^2} (||b - \bar{b}||^2_2 + ||P_g - \bar{P}_g||^2_2 + ||\lambda - \bar{\lambda}||^2_2).$$

(14)

where $x = \text{col}(\varphi, \omega, b, P_g, \lambda)$. Then the closed-loop system obtained by combining (4) and (12) is compactly written as

$$\dot{x} = F(x) = Q^{-1} A \dot{Q}^{-1} \nabla V(x)$$

(15)

with $Q = Q^T = \text{blockdiag}(I, M, \frac{P_d}{\sigma}, \frac{T_d}{\sigma}, \frac{\sigma}{\sigma}) > 0$ and

$$A = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & DT & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
-D_T & -A & 0 & \sigma I & 0 \\
0 & 0 & -Q^{-1} & I & 0 \\
0 & -\sigma I & -I & -\rho I^T & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & -1^T & 0
\end{bmatrix}.$$ 

By exploiting the structure of the system, we obtain the dissipation inequality

$$\dot{V} = \frac{1}{2} (\nabla V(x))^T Q^{-1} (A + A^T) Q^{-1} \nabla V(x) \leq 0.$$ 

(16)

However, since $R := -A^T$ is only positive semi-definite, $V$ is not strictly decreasing along the trajectories of (15). Nevertheless, one can employ this function, cf. [19], and invoke the LaSalle Invariance Principle to characterize the local asymptotic convergence properties of the dynamics. Here, we show that, in fact, the dynamics is locally input-to-state (LISS) stable, as defined in [27], and therefore robust to additive disturbances. Our key tool to establish this is the identification of a LISS-Lyapunov function, which in general is far from trivial for dynamics that involve saddle-point dynamics. To this end, consider the system

$$\dot{x} = F(x) + Bd$$

(17)

for some $B \in \mathbb{R}^{4n \times q}$ and disturbance signal $d \in \mathbb{R}^q$. While the function $V$ defined in (14) does not qualify for being a LISS Lyapunov function, the next result shows that adding suitable cross-terms to it yields a LISS-Lyapunov function for the system (17).

Theorem IV.1. (LISS-Lyapunov function for the interconnected dynamics): Consider the interconnected dynamics (17) and define the function

$$W_c(x) = V(x) + c_1^1 \varphi \varphi^T + c_2 (P_g - \bar{P}_g)^T T_g (\varphi - \bar{\varphi}) - \frac{c_3}{2 \sigma} (\lambda - \bar{\lambda})^T T_g (\varphi - \bar{\varphi}),$$

(18)

with parameters $c_1 = c_1, c_2, c_3 \in \mathbb{R}_+^q$ and $V$ given by (14). Given the equilibrium $\bar{x} = \text{col}(\bar{\varphi}, \bar{\omega}, \bar{b}, \bar{P}_d, \bar{\lambda})$ of (15), let $\bar{\eta} = D^T D \varphi$. For $\gamma$ such that $||\bar{\eta}||_\infty < \gamma < \frac{1}{2}$, define the closed convex set

$$\Omega = \{x = \text{col}(\varphi, \omega, b, P_g, \lambda) | D^T D \varphi \in [-\gamma, \gamma]^n\}.$$ 

(19)

Then there exist sufficiently small $c$ such that $W_c(x)$ is an LISS-Lyapunov function of (17) on $\Omega$. In particular, there exist constants $\alpha, \chi, c_1, c_2 > 0$ such that for all $x \in \Omega$ and all $d$ satisfying $||d|| \leq \chi ||x - \bar{x}||$, we have

$$\frac{1}{2} c_1 ||x - \bar{x}||^2 \leq W_c(x) \leq \frac{1}{2} c_2 ||x - \bar{x}||^2,$$

(20a)

$$(\nabla W_c(x))^T (F(x) + Bd) \leq -\alpha ||x - \bar{x}||^2.$$ 

(20b)

We refer to Appendix A for the proof of Theorem IV.1. Using the characterization (20) and [28, Theorem 4.10], each
trajectory of (15) initialized in a compact level set contained in \( \Omega \) exponentially converges to the equilibrium \( \bar{x} \) corresponding to economic dispatch and the efficient Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we exploit the local ISS property of (17) guaranteed by Theorem IV.1 next to develop a time-triggered hybrid implementation.

V. TIME-TRIGGERED IMPLEMENTATION: ITERATIVE BID UPDATE AND MARKET CLEARING

In realistic implementations, the bidding process between the ISO and the generators is not performed continuously. Given the availability of digital communications, it is reasonable to instead model it as an iterative process. Building on the continuous-time bidding dynamics proposed in Section IV, here we develop a time-triggered hybrid implementation that combines the discrete nature of bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. We consider two time-scales, one (faster) for the bidding process that incorporates at each step the frequency measurements, and another one (slower) for the market clearing and updates of the power generation levels that are sent to the power network dynamics. We refer to this implementation as time-triggered because we do not necessarily prescribe the time schedules to be periodic in order to guarantee that the asymptotic stability properties are retained by the hybrid implementation.

A. Algorithm description

We start with an informal description of the iterative update scheme between the ISO and the generators, and the interconnection with the dynamics of the power network.

[Informal description]: The algorithm has two time indices, \( k \) to label the iterations on the bidding process and \( l \) to label the iteration in the market clearing process that updates the power setpoints. At each iteration \( l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} \), ISO and generators are involved in an iterative process where, at each subiteration \( k \), generators send a bid to the ISO. Once the ISO has obtained the bids and the network frequency measurements at time \( t^l_k \), it computes the new potential generation allocations, denoted \( P^0_{k+1} \in \mathbb{R}^n \), and sends the corresponding one to each generator. At the \((k+1)\)-th subiteration, each generator adjusts its bid based on their previous bid and the generation allocation received from the ISO at time \( t^l_{k+1} \). Once \( k = N_l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1} \) at time \( t^l_{N_l} \), the market is cleared, meaning that the bidding process is reset (i.e., \( k = 0 \)), the power generations in the swing equations are updated according to the current setpoints \( P^0_{g_k} \), and the index \( l \) moves to \( l + 1 \).

Figure 1 shows the two iteration layers in the update scheme. The evolution of the frequency occurs in continuous time according to (4). To relate iteration numbers with time instances on \( \mathbb{R} \), we consider time sequences of the form \( \{t^l_k\}_{k=0}^{N_l} \) which satisfy

\[
 t^l_k - t^l_{k-1} > 0, \quad t^{l+1}_0 = t^l_{N_l}, \quad \forall l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}, \forall k \in [N_l].
\]  

Here \( N_l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1} \) is the number of bid iterates before the bidding process of market clearing instance \( l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} \) stops, see Figure 1. Algorithm 1 formally describes the iterative updates of the bidding process between the generators and the ISO.

Algorithm 1: Iterative Bid Update and Market Clearing Algorithm

**Executed by**: generators \( i \in [n] \) and ISO

**Data** : time sequence \( \{\{t^l_{k}\}_{k=0}^{N_l}, \lambda_{\infty}\}_{l=0}\) cost function (5) for each generator \( i \); frequency deviation \( \omega(t^l_k) \) at each time \( t^l_k \) and load \( P_d \) for ISO

**Initialize**: each generator \( i \) selects arbitrarily \( b^0_i \geq c_i \), sets \( k = 0, l = 0 \), and jumps to step 6; ISO selects arbitrary \( P^0_{g_l} \geq 0, \lambda^0_l > 0 \), sets \( k = 0, l = 0 \) and waits for step 8

1. while \( l \geq 0 \) do
2. 
3. /* For each generator \( i \): */
4. 
5. Receive \( P^0_{g_i} \) from ISO at \( t^l_k \); Set \( b^k_i = b^0_i + (t^l_{k+1} - t^l_k)T_{gi}^{-1}(P^k_{g_i} - q_i(t^l_k)\omega(t^l_k)) \)
6. Send \( b^{k+1}_i \) to the ISO; set \( k = k + 1 \)
7. /* For ISO: */
8. 
9. Receive \( b^k_i, \omega(t^l_k) \) from each \( i \in [n] \) at \( t^l_k \)
10. Set \( P^k_{g_i} = \frac{P^0_{g_i}}{\omega} + (t^l_{k+1} - t^l_k)T_{gi}^{-1}(\lambda^k_i - b^k_i - \sigma^2 \omega(t^l_k) - \rho \sum_{i \in [n]} (P_{di} - P^k_{g_i})) \) for all \( i \in [n] \)
11. \( \lambda^k_i = \lambda^0_l \) + \( \sum_{i \in [n]} (P_{di} - P^k_{g_i}) \)
12. 
13. Send \( P^{k+1}_{g_i} \) to each \( i \in [n] \), set \( k = k + 1 \)
14. 
15. end

For analysis purposes, we find it convenient to represent the dynamics resulting from the combination of Algorithm 1 and the network dynamics (4) as the time-triggered continuous-time system

\[
\dot{\phi}(t) = D^T \omega(t), \\
M \dot{\omega}(t) = -D^T \nabla U(\phi(t)) - A \omega(t) + P_g(t_0) - P_d, \\
T_p \dot{b}(t) = P_g(t^l_k) - Q^{-1} b(t^l_k) - Q^{-1} c, \\
T_p \dot{P}_g(t) = 1(\lambda(t^l_k) - b(t^l_k) - \sigma^2 \omega(t^l_k) - \rho \mathbb{1}^T(P_d - P_g(t^l_k)), \\
T_p \tau \dot{\lambda}(t) = 1^T(P_d - P_g(t^l_k)),
\]

for \( t \in [t^l_k, t^l_{k+1}] \subset [t^l_0, t^l_{N_l+1}], l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}, k \in \{0, \ldots, N_l - 1\} \). We write the system (22) compactly in the form

\[
\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t)) + g(x(t)) + h(x(t)),
\]

with

\[
f(x) = \begin{cases} 
\cos(D^T \omega, -M^{-1}(D^T \nabla U(\phi) + A \omega + P_d), 0, 0, 0), \\
\cos(0, 0, T_p^{-1} P_g - Q^{-1} b - Q^{-1} c), \\
T_p^{-1} \mathbb{1} \lambda - \sigma^2 \omega + \rho \mathbb{1}^T(P_d - P_g), \\
\tau \mathbb{1}^T(P_d - P_g),
\end{cases}
\]

\[
g(x) = \begin{cases} 
0, 0, \\
0, 0, 0, \\
0, 0, \\
0, 0.
\end{cases}
\]
With this notation, note that the continuous-time dynamics (15) corresponds to
\[
\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t)) + g(x(t)) + h(x(t)).
\]
Since \( \sup_{\varphi \in \mathbb{R}^{n-1}} \| \nabla^2 U(\varphi) \| < \infty \) and \( g, h \) are globally Lipschitz (we denote by \( L_f, L_g, L_h \) their Lipschitz constants, respectively). When viewed as a continuous-time system, the dynamics (22) has a discontinuous right-hand side, and therefore we consider its solutions in the Carathéodory sense, cf. [29].

**B. Sufficient condition on triggering times for stability**

In this section we establish conditions on the time sequence that guarantee that the solutions of (22) are well-defined and retain the convergence properties of (15). Specifically, we determine a sufficient condition on the inter-sampling times \( t_{k+1}^t - t_k^t \) for bidding and \( t_{k+1}^{t+1} - t_k^t \) for market clearing that ensure local asymptotic convergence of (23) to the equilibrium \( \bar{x} \) of the continuous-time system (15).

Our strategy to accomplish this relies on the robustness properties of (15) characterized in Theorem IV.1 and the fact that the time-triggered implementation, represented by (23), can be regarded as an approximation of the continuous-time dynamics, represented by (24). We use the Lyapunov function \( W_c \) defined by (18) and examine the mismatch between both dynamics to derive upper bounds on the inter-event times that guarantee that \( W_c \) is strictly decreasing along the time-triggered system (22).

**Theorem V.1. (Local asymptotic stability of time-triggered implementation):** Consider the time-triggered implementation (22) of the interconnection between the ISO-generator bidding processes and the power network dynamics. With the notation of Theorem IV.1, let
\[
\tilde{\zeta} := \frac{1}{L_f + L_g} \log \left( 1 + \frac{\beta (L_f + L_g)}{L f \theta + L_h + \beta} \right),
\]
\[
\hat{\zeta} := \frac{1}{L_f} \log \left( 1 + \frac{L_g (L f \theta + \alpha + \beta (L f \theta + L_g))}{L f \theta + L_h + \alpha (L f \theta + L_g)} \right),
\]
where \( 0 < \beta < \alpha \), \( L := L_f + L_g + L_h \), and \( L f \theta \) is the Lipschitz constant of \( \nabla W_c \). Assume the time sequence \( \{t_{k}^{N_t}\}_{k=0}^{\infty} \) satisfies, for some \( \zeta \in (0, \tilde{\zeta}) \) and \( \xi \in (0, \hat{\zeta}) \),
\[
\zeta \leq t_{k+1}^{t+1} - t_k^t \leq \tilde{\zeta} \quad \text{and} \quad \xi \leq t_k^t - t_{k-1}^{t+1} \leq \xi,
\]
for all \( l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} \) and \( k \in [N_t] \). Then, \( \bar{x} \) is locally asymptotically stable under (22).

We refer the reader to Appendix B for the proof of Theorem V.1. The uniform lower bounds \( \zeta \) and \( \xi \) in (26) ensure that the solutions of the time-triggered implementation (22) are well-defined, avoiding Zeno behavior. Theorem V.1 implies that convergence is guaranteed for any constant stepsize implementation, where the sufficiently small stepsize satisfies (26). However, the result of Theorem V.1 is more general and does not require constant stepsizes. Another interesting observation is that the upper bounds can be calculated without requiring any information about the equilibrium \( \bar{x} \). This is desirable, as this equilibrium is not known beforehand and must be determined by the algorithm itself.

**Remark V.2. (General cost functions, generator box constraints, and elastic demand):** We briefly discuss here the feasibility and challenges involved in extending the present treatment along different directions.

**General cost functions:** The results presented above also hold for general convex (instead of quadratic) cost functions. Specifically, if there exist \( c_1, c_2 \in \mathbb{R}_{>0} \) such that
\[
0 < c_1 I \preceq \nabla^2 C(P_g) \preceq c_2 I \quad \text{for all} \ P_g \in \mathbb{R}_+, \n
\]
then one can establish LISS of the closed-loop system and compute bounds on the inter-event times to guarantee local asymptotic stability. However, this setting requires a significant more technical derivation and therefore it is omitted in the present work.

**Generator box constraints:** An interesting extension would be the inclusion in (7) of box constraints on power generation. Such extension would require the re-examination of the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, as generators may take advantage of them to arbitrarily increase their individual profit, and the modification of the proposed algorithm to accommodate these constraints, e.g., by using projections in the dynamics. The latter makes it difficult to assess LISS as the characterization of the input-to-state stability properties of projected dynamics systems is still open.

**Elastic demand:** Our treatment here has considered inelastic loads. If instead loads are flexible, i.e., the demand is elastic, then consumers would also react to prices, possibly in a price-taking manner as in a Cournot-type of competitive market. This implies that the game-theoretic model has
to be revised to accommodate loads that change with generator bids/prices. The investigation of how to carry this out is an interesting topic for future research.

VI. SIMULATIONS

In this section we illustrate the convergence properties of the interconnected time-triggered system (22). We consider the IEEE 14-bus power network depicted in Figure 2, where each node has one generator and one load according to model (2). We assume costs at each node \( i \in [14] \) of the form

\[
C_i(P_{gi}) = \frac{1}{2}q_i P_{gi}^2 + c_i P_{gi},
\]

with \( q_i > 0 \) and \( c_i \geq 0 \). In the original IEEE 14-bus benchmark model, nodes 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 have synchronous generators while the other nodes are load nodes and have no power generation. We replicate this by suitably choosing the cost at the load nodes such that the optimizer of the economic dispatch problem (7) is zero at them. In addition, we choose \( M_i \in [4,5.5] \) for generator nodes \( i \in \{1,2,3,6,8\} \) and \( M_i \ll 1 \) for the load nodes. We set \( A_i \in [1.5,2.5], \tau_i \in [1,1.06], \theta_{bi} \in [0.0005,0.001], T_{gi} = 13.5 \) for all \( i \in [14] \) and \( \rho = 900 \). The other parameter values for the ISO dynamics (12b) are \( \tau_{\lambda} = 0.0004, \rho = 3, \sigma = 17 \).

At time \( t = 0 \) s, the inelastic load (in MW’s) is given by

\[
P_d = (0,20,86,43,7,10,0,0,27,8,3,6,12,14).
\]

Initially, we set \( (q_1,q_2,q_3,q_6,q_8) = (22,128,45,60,30), (c_1,c_2,c_3,c_6,c_8) = (7.5,7.5,7.5,7.5,7.5) \) and \( q_i = 1500, c_i = 26 \) for the remaining nodes. The time-triggered system (22) is initialized at steady state at the optimal generation level

\[
(P_{g1}, P_{g2}, P_{g3}, P_{g6}, P_{g8}) = (85,15,42,31,63),
\]

and with \( P_{gi} = 0 \) for all other nodes. Figures 3-5 depict the simulation of the time-triggered system for different triggering times. At \( t = 1 \) s all the loads are increased by 10%, and we set \( c_i = 28 \) for the load nodes. As observed in all figures, the trajectories converge to a new efficient equilibrium with optimal power generation level

\[
(P_{g1}, P_{g2}, P_{g3}, P_{g6}, P_{g8}) = (94,16,46,34,69),
\]

and \( P_{gi} = 0 \) for all other nodes. Furthermore, at steady state the generators all bid equal to the Lagrange multiplier which, by Proposition III.1, corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium.

At \( t = 15 \) s the cost functions of the generators are changed to \( (q_1,q_2,q_3,q_6,q_8) = (23,116,48,63,38), (c_1,c_2,c_3,c_6,c_8) = (7.5,6,13.5,15,10.5) \) and \( q_i = 1500, c_i = 33 \) for the remaining nodes. As a result, the optimal dispatch of power changes. Due to the changes of the power generation, a temporary frequency imbalance occurs. As illustrated in Figures 3-5, the power generations converge to the new optimal steady state given by

\[
(P_{g1}, P_{g2}, P_{g3}, P_{g6}, P_{g8}) = (108,23,40,28,60).
\]

In addition, we observe that after each change of either the load or the cost function, the frequency is stabilized and the bids converge to a new efficient Nash equilibrium. The fact that the frequency transients are better in Figures 3-4 (with inter-event times of maximal 2 ms for bidding and on average respectively 50 ms, 62.5 ms for market clearing) than in Figure 5 (with inter-event times of 2 ms for bidding and 160 ms for market clearing) is to be expected given the longer inter-event times in the second case. A slight increase in the inter-event times for Figure 5 in either bid updating or market clearing time result in an unstable system. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the interconnected system with the primary/secondary and tertiary control layers separated and its loss of efficiency compared to the proposed integrated design.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has studied the joint operation of the economic dispatch and frequency regulation layers, which are traditionally separated in the control of power networks. The starting point of our design was a continuous-time bid update scheme coupled with the frequency dynamics whose equilibrium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Building on the identification of a novel LISS-Lyapunov function for this dynamics, we have characterized its robustness properties against additive disturbances. We have exploited the LISS-property to propose a provably correct multi-rate hybrid implementation that combines the iterative nature of the fast bid updates and the slower power setpoint updates with the continuous frequency network dynamics. Our results show that real-time iterative bidding can successfully be interconnected with frequency control to increase efficiency while retaining stability of the power system. Future work will incorporate elastic demand, generator bounds, and power flow constraints in the formulation. We also wish to explore more general bids including piecewise constant and linear supply functions. Finally, we aim to develop distributed and opportunistic self-triggered implementations of the proposed dynamics, and characterize the convergence properties of data-driven optimization algorithms.

APPENDIX A

PROOF OF THEOREM IV.1

We structure the proof of Theorem IV.1 in two separate parts, corresponding to the inequalities (20a) and (20b), respectively.
A. Positive definiteness of Lyapunov function \( W_e \)

Let \( \bar{x} \) be the equilibrium of (15) satisfying the hypothesis. We now prove the existence of constants \( c_1, c_2, c_0 > 0 \) such that (20a) holds, given the constants \( \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_3 > 0 \). The Hessian of \( W_e \) (eq. (18)) is given by a block-diagonal matrix

\[
\nabla^2 W_e(x) = \text{blockdiag}(H_1(\varphi), H_2) \text{ with upper left block as}
\]

\[
H_1(\varphi) = \begin{bmatrix}
\nabla^2 U(\varphi) & \epsilon_0 \epsilon_1 D^T M
\end{bmatrix}
\]

and the lower right block is given by

\[
H_2 = \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \begin{bmatrix}
T_b & -\epsilon_0 \epsilon_2 T_g & 0 \\
-\epsilon_0 \epsilon_2 T_g & T_g & -\epsilon_0 \epsilon_3 T_g \mathbb{I} \\
0 & -\epsilon_0 \epsilon_3 T_g & \tau_\lambda
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

We will now show that there exists sufficiently small \( \epsilon_0 \) such that \( H_1(\varphi), H_2 \) are both positive definite for all \( x \in \Omega \). To this end, let us define the function

\[
\mathcal{L}(\eta) = D^T D \Gamma \cos(\eta) D^T D^T
\]

and note that

\[
\mathcal{L}(D^T D^T \varphi) = \nabla^2 U(\varphi),
\]

implying that

\[
0 < \mathcal{L}(\varphi) \leq \nabla^2 U(\varphi) \leq \nabla^2 U(0) = \mathcal{L}(0) \quad \forall x \in \Omega.
\]

Consequently, for \( \mathcal{D} := \epsilon_0 \epsilon_1 D^T M \), we have

\[
\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{D}) \leq H_1(\varphi) \leq \mathcal{L}(0) \quad \forall x \in \Omega.
\]

By considering the Schur complements, the matrices \( K_1, K_2 \) are shown to be positive definite by choosing \( \epsilon_0 > 0 \) sufficiently small such that

\[
\mathcal{L}(\gamma \mathbb{I}) - \epsilon_0^2 \epsilon_1^2 D^T M D^T > 0, \\
T_b - \epsilon_0 \epsilon_2 T_g > 0, \\
\tau_\lambda - \epsilon_0 \epsilon_3 T_g > 0.
\]

Next we define

\[
c_1 := \min \{ \lambda_{\min}(K_1), \lambda_{\min}(H_2) \}, \\
c_2 := \max \{ \lambda_{\max}(K_2), \lambda_{\max}(H_2) \},
\]

where \( \lambda_{\min}(A), \lambda_{\max}(A) \) denote the smallest and largest eigenvalue of the matrix \( A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} \). Note that \( c_1, c_2 > 0 \) and the following holds

\[
0 < c_1 I \leq \nabla^2 W_e(x) \leq c_2 I, \quad \forall x \in \Omega.
\]
Then, the system (15) reads as

\[ \begin{align*}
T_\theta \dot{\theta} &= P_g - Q^{-1} \theta, \\
T_\theta \dot{P}_g &= 1 - b - \rho I^T \hat{P}_g - \sigma \omega, \\
\tau \lambda &= -I^T \hat{P}_g.
\end{align*} \]

In addition, note that \( W_c \) (eq. (18)) takes the form

\[ W_c(x) = V(x) + V_c(x), \]

\[ V_c(x) = c_0 \theta^T d I^T M \omega - \frac{\epsilon_0 \omega}{\sigma \theta} b^T T_g \hat{P}_g - \frac{\epsilon_0 \omega}{\sigma \theta} \hat{P}_g^T T_g \hat{P}_g. \]

Next, we determine the time-derivative of the individual terms of the candidate Lyapunov function \( W_c \).

(0): First, observe from (16) that

\[ \dot{V} = -\omega^T A \omega - \frac{1}{\omega} (b - \bar{b})^T Q^{-1} (b - \bar{b}) - \frac{\partial V}{\partial \hat{P}_g} (P_g - \hat{P}_g)^T I^T (P_g - \hat{P}_g). \]

(1): The time-derivative of the first term of \( V_c \) satisfies

\[ \frac{d}{dt} \dot{\theta}^T D_{\theta}^T M \omega = \dot{\theta}^T M D_{\theta}^T D_{\theta} \dot{\omega} - \dot{\theta}^T D_{\theta}^T D_{\theta} (\nabla U(\phi) - \nabla U(\hat{\phi})) - \dot{\phi}^T D_{T} (\nabla U(\phi) - \nabla U(\hat{\phi})). \]

By exploiting \( D_{\theta}^T D_{\theta} = I \), the second term is rewritten as

\[ -\dot{\phi}^T D_{T} (\nabla U(\phi) - \nabla U(\hat{\phi})) = -\dot{\phi}^T U(\phi) \phi^T, \]
where we used that $\nabla U(\varphi) - \nabla U(\bar{\varphi}) = U(\varphi)(\varphi - \bar{\varphi})$ with

$$U(\varphi) = \int_0^1 \nabla^2 U((\varphi - \bar{\varphi})\theta + \bar{\varphi}) d\theta.$$  \hfill (34)

Since $U(\varphi) \geq \|\mathbf{1}\| = D_1^T D_1 \cos(\|\mathbf{1}\|) D_1 D_1^T$ (see eq. (27)) for all $x \in \Omega$, we obtain

$$\frac{d}{d\tau} \varphi^T D_1^T M \omega = \omega^T M D_1^T D_1^T \omega - \varphi^T M \Omega(\|\mathbf{1}\|) \varphi^T - \varphi^T D_1^T A \omega + \varphi^T D_1^T \tilde{P} \hat{g},$$

(2): For the second term of $V$, the following holds:

$$\frac{d}{d\tau} \tilde{b}^T T_g \tilde{P} g = \tilde{b}_1^T T_g \tilde{P} g - \tilde{b}_1^T T_g Q^{-1} \tilde{b}_1 + \tilde{b}^T \tilde{A} \omega - \tilde{b}^T D_1^T \tilde{P} \hat{g} - \rho \tilde{b}^T \tilde{P} g - \sigma \tilde{b}^T \omega.$$

where we define $T_g := T_g T_{\lambda}^{-1}$.

(3): Similarly, by defining $T_{g} := T_g T_{\lambda}^{-1}$ we obtain

$$\frac{d}{d\tau} \tilde{\lambda}^T T_g \tilde{P} g = -\tilde{b}_1^T T_g \tilde{P} g + n^2 \tilde{\lambda}^T - \rho \tilde{\lambda}^T \tilde{P} g - \sigma^2 \tilde{\lambda}^T \omega,$$

where $\tilde{\lambda}$ is given by (35) (see page 11), $\tilde{P}$ takes the form

$$\tilde{P} = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & I & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \frac{1}{2} I & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \frac{1}{2} I \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix},$$

and $M := D_1^T D_1^T + D_1 D_1^T, T := T_g \tilde{\lambda}^T + \tilde{\lambda}^T T_g \lambda$.

Next, we will show that there exists $c_0, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 > 0$ such that $\Xi$ is positive definite.

This can be done by successive use of the Schur complement. In particular, for $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}, B \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}, C \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}, \beta > 0$, recall that

$$\begin{bmatrix}
\beta A & B \\
B^T & C
\end{bmatrix} > 0 \iff C > 0 \& \beta A - BC^{-1} B^T > 0.$$

For successively applying this result to $\Xi$, given by (35), let us first fix $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 > 0$. Then $\epsilon_2$ can be chosen sufficiently large such that the lower-right $3 \times 3$ block submatrix of $\Xi$ is positive definite. Then we can choose a $\epsilon_0 > 0$ sufficiently small such that (28) holds and $\Xi > 0$. Here, note that choosing $\epsilon_0$ smaller does not affect the positive definiteness of the lower-right $3 \times 3$ block submatrix of $\Xi$. By construction of $\epsilon_0, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_3$, there exist constants $c_1, c_2, c_3 \in \mathbb{R}_{> 0}$ such that (20a) holds for all $x \in \Omega$, see also Section A-A. In addition, for this choice of $\epsilon$ we have that $\Xi > 0$ and, as a result, there exists $\alpha := \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_0 \lambda_{\min}(\Xi) > 0$ such that

$$(\nabla W(x))^T F(x) \leq -\hat{\alpha} \|x - \bar{x}\|^2$$

for all $x \in \Omega$. Next, we consider the case when the disturbance is present. Let $\chi$ satisfy $0 < \chi < \hat{\alpha}/(L_W \|B\|)$. Then, by exploiting the Lipschitz property of $\nabla W(x)$,

$$\left(\nabla W(x)^T (F(x) + Bd) \leq -\hat{\alpha} \|x - \bar{x}\|^2 + \nabla W(x)^T Bd \leq -\hat{\alpha} \|x - \bar{x}\|^2 + L_W \|B\| \|x - \bar{x}\| \|d\| \right),$$

$$\leq -(\hat{\alpha} - L_W \|B\| \|x - \bar{x}\|^2 = -\alpha \|x - \bar{x}\|^2$$

with $\alpha := \hat{\alpha} - L_W \|B\| \|x\| > 0$ and thus (20b) holds. This concludes the proof of Theorem IV.1.

**APPENDIX B**

**PROOF OF THEOREM V.1**

Here we prove Theorem V.1. To do so, we rely on Gronwall’s inequality, which in general allows to bound the evolution of continuous-time and discrete-time signals described by differential and difference equations, respectively. Given the hybrid nature of the time-triggered dynamics (22), we rely on a version of Gronwall’s inequality for hybrid systems developed in [30]. Adapted for our purposes, it states the following.

**Proposition B.1. (Generalized Gronwall’s inequality [30]):**

Let $t \mapsto y(t) \in \mathbb{R}$ be a continuous signal, $t \mapsto p(t) \in \mathbb{R}$ be a continuously differentiable signal, $r := \{r_j\}_{j=1}^\infty$ be a nonnegative sequence of real numbers, $q \geq 0$ a constant, and $E := \{j_{l} \}_{l=0}^\infty$, $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$ be a sequence of times satisfying $t_j < t_{j+1}$ for all $j \in \{0, \ldots, k\}$. Suppose that for all $t \in [t_0, t_{k+1}]$, the elements $y, p, r$ satisfy

$$y(t) \leq p(t) + q \int_{t_0}^t y(s) ds + \sum_{i=0}^{j-1} r_i y(t_{j+1})$$

with $i(t) := \max\{i \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0} : t_i \leq t, t_i \in E\}$ for $t < t_{k+1}$ and $i(t_{k+1}) := k$. Then,

$$y(t) \leq p(t_0) h(t_0, t) + \int_{t_0}^t h(s, t) p(s) ds$$

for all $t \in [t_0, t_{k+1}]$ where for all $t_0 \leq s \leq t \leq t_{k+1}$. $h(s, t) := \exp (q(t-s) + \sum_{i=s}^{\min(t, r_j)} 1 + r_j)$.  \hfill (38)

We are now ready to prove Theorem V.1.

**Proof of Theorem V.1:** Let $\{t_k^l\}_{k=0}^\infty \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ be a sequence of times satisfying the hypotheses. Consider a trajectory $t \mapsto x(t)$ of (22) with $x(0)$ belonging to a neighborhood of $\bar{x}$. The definition of this neighborhood will show up later. Our proof strategy involves showing the monotonic decrease of the function $W_t$ (cf. (18)) along this arbitrarily chosen trajectory. Consider any $t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ such that $t \not\in \{t_k^l\}_{k=0}^\infty$ for any $l \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ and $x(t) \in \Omega$ where $\Omega$ is defined by (19). With a slight abuse of notation let $l$ and $k \in \{0, \ldots, N_t - 1\}$ be fixed such that $t \in (t_k^l, t_{k+1})$. Then, using the expression of $F(x) = f(x) + g(x) + h(x)$ given in (24), one can write the evolution of $x$ at $t$ for the considered trajectory as

$$\dot{x}(t) = F(x(t)) + g(x(t_k^l)) - g(x(t)) + h(x(t_k^l)) - h(x(t)).$$

(1) **Dissipation inequality:** Note that at $t$ the evolution of $W_t$ is equal to the dot product between the gradient of $W_t$ and right-hand side of the above equation. Hence, we get

$$\dot{W}_t(x(t)) = (\nabla W_t(x(t))^T \left(F(x(t)) + g(x(t_k^l)) - g(x(t)) + h(x(t_k^l)) - h(x(t))\right).$$

From (20b), we have $\nabla W_t(x(t))^T F(x(t)) \leq -\alpha \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|^2$.
Proposition B.1. Drawing a parallelism between the notations, instances (23) as the line integral

\[ \lambda \int_{t_0}^{t} f(s)ds \]

(II) Bounds on \( \|x(t) - x(t_0)\| \): Note that \( x(t) \) can be written using (23) as the line integral

\[ x(t) - x_0 = \int_{t_0}^{t} f(x(s))ds + \zeta_k(t)g(x_k(t)) + \zeta(t) \hat{h}(x_0) \]

Above, we have added and subtracted \( \zeta_k(t)f(x_k) \) and subtracted \( f(\bar{x}) + g(\bar{x}) + h(\bar{x}) \) as \( \bar{x} \) is an equilibrium. Using Lipschitz bounds and triangle inequality in (41) we obtain

\[ \|x(t) - x_k(t)\| \leq L_f \int_{t_0}^{t} \|x(s) - x_k\|ds \]

We wish to obtain an upper bound on \( \|x(t) - x_k\| \) that is independent of the state at times \( s \in (t_k, t) \). To this end, we employ Gronwall’s inequality as stated in its general form in Proposition B.1. Drawing a parallelism between the notations, for (42), we consider \( E = 0, r = 0, y(t) = \|x(t) - x_k\|, q = L_f, p(t) = \zeta(t)(L_f + L_g)\|x_k - \bar{x}\| + \zeta(t)L_h\|x_0 - \bar{x}\| \)

and replace \( t_0 \) by \( t_k \). With these choices, the hypothesis (36) is satisfied (as it exactly corresponds to (42) above). Then, with the notation of Proposition B.1, we have

\[ h(s, t) = e^{L_f(t-s)} \]

and (37) reads as

\[ \|x(t) - x_k\| \leq \int_{t_k}^{t} e^{L_f(t-s)}(L_f + L_g)\|x_k - \bar{x}\| + L_h\|x_0 - \bar{x}\|ds \]

Bounding the above inequality using the triangle inequality collecting coefficients of \( \|x(t) - x_k\| \) on the left-hand side, and rearranging gives

\[ \|x(t) - x_k\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f - (L_f + L_g)(e^{L_f(t)} - 1)}\|x_0 - \bar{x}\| \]

(III) Bounds on \( \|x(t) - x(t_0)\| \): Our next step is to provide an upper bound on the term \( \|x(t) - x_0\| \). Recall that the considered trajectory satisfies (23) and so, the line integral over the interval \([t_0, t]\) gives

\[ x(t) - x_0 = \int_{t_0}^{t} f(x(s))ds + \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} e^{j+1}_r g(x_j) + \zeta(t)g(x_k(t)) + \zeta(t)h(x_0) \]

As done before, on the right-hand side, we add and subtract the terms \( \zeta(t)g(x_k(t)) \) and \( \zeta(t)h(x_0) \) and then subtract \( f(\bar{x}) + g(\bar{x}) + h(\bar{x}) \). This gives us

\[ x(t) - x_0 = \int_{t_0}^{t} f(x(s))ds + \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} e^{j+1}_r g(x_j) \]

By defining \( L := L_f + L_g + L_h \), taking the norms, using the global Lipschitzness, we obtain from above

\[ \|x(t) - x_0\| \leq L_f \int_{t_0}^{t} \|x(s) - x_0\|ds + \zeta(t)\|L\|x_0 - \bar{x}\| \]

Consider any \( \tilde{t} \in [t, t_{k+1}] \) and note that \( \zeta(t) \leq \zeta(\tilde{t}) \). Using this bound and the fact that the first term in the above summation is zero, we write

\[ \|x(t) - x_0\| \leq L_f \int_{t_0}^{\tilde{t}} \|x(s) - x_0\|ds + \zeta(\tilde{t})L\|x_0 - \bar{x}\| \]

We now apply Proposition B.1 to give a bound for the left-hand side independent of \( x(s), s \in (t_k, t) \). In order to do so, the elements corresponding to those in the Gronwall’s inequality are:

\[ E = \{t_j\}_{j=0}^{k-1} \cup \{\tilde{t}\}, y(t) = \|x(t) - x_0\|, p(t) = \zeta(\tilde{t})L\|x_0 - \bar{x}\|, q = L_f, r_{j} = L_gj^{2j+1}, \]

and \( r_{k-1} = t - t_k \). From Proposition B.1, we get

\[ \|x(t) - x_0\| \leq L||x_0 - \bar{x}|| \int_{t_0}^{\tilde{t}} h(s, t)ds, \]

where \( h(s, t) = \exp (\int_{s}^{\tilde{t}} L_fdT + \sum_{j=0}^{k-2} \log(1 + e^{j+1}_r L_0) + \log(1 + L_g\zeta(\tilde{t}))) \) and \( s \) is as defined in Proposition B.1.
Using \( \log(1 + x) \leq x \) for \( x \geq 0 \) and the fact that the exponential is a monotonically increasing function, we get

\[
h(s, t) \leq \exp \left( \frac{L_f(t - s) + L_g \sum_{j=i(s)}^{j+1} \delta_j + L_g \zeta_k(t)}{} \right).
\]

By noting that \( s \leq i(s) + 1 \) and \( t \leq t \), we can upper bound the right-hand side as \( h(s, t) \leq \exp \left( \frac{L_f(t - s) + L_g(t - s)}{} \right) \).

Since \( t \) was chosen arbitrarily in the interval \([t, k+1]\), we pick it equal to \( t \). Thus, \( h(s, t) \leq \exp \left( \frac{L_g + L_f(t - s)}{} \right) \).

Substituting this inequality in (45) yields

\[
\|x(t) - x_0\| \leq L\|x_0 - \bar{x}\| + \int_t^{t+1} e^{L_f(s-r)}(s-r) \, ds \\
= \frac{L_f + L_g}{L_f + L_g - L(e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1)} \|x_0 - \bar{x}\|. \tag{46}
\]

This inequality when used in the right-hand side of the triangle inequality \( \|x_0 - \bar{x}\| \leq \|x(t) - x_0\| + \|x(t) - \bar{x}\| \) yields after rearrangement the following

\[
\|x_0 - \bar{x}\| \leq \frac{L_f + L_g}{L_f + L_g - L(e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|. \tag{47}
\]

Subsequently, using the above bound in (46) gives

\[
\|x(t) - x_0\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f + L_g - L(e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|. \tag{48}
\]

Combining inequalities (44) and (47) we obtain

\[
\|x(t) - x_k\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f - (L_f + L_g)(e^{L_f} - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\| + \frac{L_f + L_g - L(e^{L_f} - 1)}{L_f + L_g - L(e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|.
\]

Using the definition of \( \zeta(t) \), one gets \( e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1 = \beta L_f + L_g \). Substituting this value in the above inequality and simplifying the expression provides us

\[
\|x(t) - x_0\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f - (L_f + L_g)(e^{L_f} - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|. \tag{49}
\]

(IV) Monotonic decrease of \( W_k \): Note first that following (48) and using the bound \( \xi(t) \leq \zeta(t) \) yields

\[
\|x(t) - x_0\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f - (L_f + L_g)(e^{L_f} - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|.
\]

Using the definition of \( \zeta(t) \), one gets \( e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1 = \frac{\beta L_f + L_g}{L_f + L_g} \). Substituting this value in the above inequality and simplifying the expression provides us

\[
\|x(t) - x_0\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f - (L_f + L_g)(e^{L_f} - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|. \tag{50}
\]

In a similar way, using the bound on \( \xi(t) \) and substituting the value of \( e^{L_f + L_g} \zeta(t) - 1 \) in (49) and simplifying yields

\[
\|x(t) - x_k\| \leq \frac{L_f}{L_f - (L_f + L_g)(e^{L_f} - 1)} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|.
\]

Note that \( \zeta_k(t) \leq \zeta(t) \). Using this bound and the definition of \( \zeta(t) \) in the above inequality gives

\[
\|x(t) - x_k\| \leq \frac{\alpha - \beta}{L_f + L_g} \|x(t) - \bar{x}\|. \tag{51}
\]

Finally, substituting (50) and (51) in (40) and using the fact that \( \beta < \alpha \), we obtain \( W_k(x(t)) \) < 0. Recall that \( t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \) was chosen arbitrarily satisfying \( t \notin \{t_k\}_k \) for any \( t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} \). Therefore, \( W_k \) monotonically decreases at all times along the trajectory except for a countable number of points. Further, the map \( t \mapsto W_k(x(t)) \) is continuous. Therefore, we conclude that the trajectory initialized in a compact level set of \( W_k \) contained in \( \Omega \) converges asymptotically to the equilibrium point \( \bar{x} \). This completes the proof.

\[
\]

\[\text{REFERENCES}\]


